Evolutionary Psychology, Feminism, and the Naturalist Fallacy
I went to a Behavioral and Social Sciences Faculty Colloquium (ooh, fancy academics!) last monday night, to see the keynote speech by Daniel Worthen, psychologist and co-author of The Altruistic Species.
In his book and the lecture, Worthen challenges the commonly held view of Psychological Egoism by arguing for the existence of true human altruism. Psychological Egoism asserts that human actions and emotions are motivated solely by self-interests, and that apparent altruism in humans is merely to conceal self-interests. Similar to this theory is Psychological Hedonism, which specifies that humans are driven to act only in order to increase pleasure and avoid pain.
Not only does Worthen argue for the existence of true human altruism, but he contends that we are innately altruistic, that it is pleasurable to be altruistic, and that our capacity for reason demands that we behave as such.
A lot of the support Worthen gave for the existence of true altruism in humans was through the theory of Evolutionary Psychology (EP). Under this theory, psychological traits and mechanisms can be seen as adaptations and the result of natural selection, in the same way that physiological traits are.
EP can be applied to any animal with a nervous system, but the majority of the studies in the field have been of human psychological characteristics. It’s within this area that there is the most controversy surrounding the application of evolution to human psychology, whereas zoological EP is much more widely accepted.
The first time I heard the term ‘Evolutionary Psychology’ was in Full Frontal Feminism, written by Jessica Valenti of Feministing.com. Valenti was critical of EP in studies that identified different psychological mechanisms in men and women affecting behavior and mate selection. In another post on Feministing she argues against another study that makes use of EP. Her problem with these studies is that their findings seem to corroborate gender stereotypes and discrimination. While I agree with Valenti’s absolute rejection of sexism, I disagree that EP itself is to blame.
I think that the authors of the study Valenti was criticizing, and Valenti herself, made a mistake by applying ethical value judgements to theoretical evolutionary origins of psychological mechanisms. Both of them have committed the naturalistic fallacy, which is very commonly done. In this fallacy, one equates being good or right with being natural. Valenti’s problem with the study was they could be suggesting that because these psychological traits were the results of evolution, it somehow made them proper or right.
The word ‘natural’ has many positive connotations in our language, and it’s a relatively judgmental word. In the same way that it’s incorrect to consider humans a more “perfectly” evolved primate than chimps, it’s wrong to apply these kinds of value judgements to other natural phenomena. Nature and natural processes aren’t intrinsically good, or bad, they’re just WHAT HAPPENS, as determined by natural laws.
While erosion can be devastating to a region, we don’t consider it wrong, we don’t think of wasps laying eggs in the backs of living caterpillars as unjust, and we don’t prosecute ant colonies for committing genocide.
No, we reserve the application of ethical judgements to human activities, because we’re the ones with the capacity for reason. Unlike rocks and fruits, we can learn how to behave. It is because we can determine the morality of our actions that we have a responsibility to do so.
So, when we look at the psychological mechanism that have been selected for in our evolution, we must withhold our ethical judgement. Though our genes may be ‘selfish’, they are not inclined to philosophical contemplation. Mechanisms like kin-selection, group-selection, and reciprocal altruism can have many effects that we are inclined to consider good and favorable, like familial bonds, camaraderie, friendship, and (as Worthen suggests) true altruism.
Yet at the same time, these mechanisms can lead to some of the ugliest sides of human nature. Being able to identify your relatives and friends can help you help them, but it also helps you hurt those outside your circle. Discrimination, prejudice, rape, genocide, all of these can be viewed as consequences of psychological mechanisms that have been selected for because they increased the likelihood that our genes would propagate.
If we rely solely on these adapted traits to determine our actions, we will fail to act rightly. We must understand that these psychological mechanisms are the product of millions of years of evolutions, thousands of years of which we have been social creatures, and on recently (on a geological timescale) have we been ethically aware.
That certain behaviors helped our ancestors survive as hunter-gatherers in prehistory doesn’t mean we have to behave the same way now. As Worthen said, it’s not necessary that we accept the bad with the good. Because we can employ reason to determine the morality of our actions, we must if we are to live morally (as determined through reason).